Abstract-We conduct a series of field experiments to evaluate the quality of advice provided by life insurance agents in India. Agents overwhelmingly recommend unsuitable, strictly dominated products that provide high commissions to the agent. Agents cater to the beliefs of uninformed consumers, even when those beliefs are wrong. We also find that agents appear to focus on maximizing the amount of premiums (and therefore their commissions) that customers pay, as opposed to focusing on how much insurance coverage customers need. A natural experiment requiring disclosure of commissions for a specific product results in agents recommending alternative products with high commissions but no disclosure requirement. A follow-up agent survey sheds light on the extent to which poor advice reflects both the commission incentives and agents' limited product knowledge.
I. Introduction
T HE recent financial crisis has spurred many countries to dramatically change how many consumer financial products are distributed, such as the U.K. ban on commission payments to independent financial advisors and the 2012 ban on entry loads in the Indian mutual fund industry. 1 Proponents of the bans argue that sales agents give poor advice, misleading consumers. Opponents argue that market discipline and reputational concerns will motivate agents to provide financial advice and customer education. This paper reports on four closely related field experiments in which we hired and trained individuals to visit life insurance agents, express interest in life insurance policies, and seek product recommendations. We focused on two common life insurance products: whole life and term life. We chose these two products because in the Indian context, consumers are much better off purchasing a term versus whole iTrust provided valuable context on the Indian insurance market for this project. We also thank Daniel Bergstresser, Sendhil Mullainathan, Petia Topalova, Peter Tufano, Shing-Yi Wang, Justin Wolfers, and various workshop participants for comments and suggestions. We thank the Harvard Lab for Economic and Policy Applications, the Division for Faculty Development and Research at Harvard Business School, Wharton Global Initiatives, Wharton Dean's Research Fund, Wharton Risk Management and Decision Processes Center, and the Penn Lauder CIBER Fund for financial support. Manoj Garg, Shahid Vaziralli, and Anand Kothari provided excellent research assistance. All three authors declare they have no relevant or material financial relationship that bears on this research. A supplemental appendix is available online at http://www.mitpress journals.org/doi/suppl/10.1162/REST_a_00625.
1 For a greater discussion of regulation, see Anagol, Cole, and Sarkar (2014). life policy. In section II, we detail how large this violation of the law of one price can be. The combination of a savings account and a term insurance policy can provide over six times as much value as a whole life insurance policy.
One major result, which we find consistently through all of our experiments, is that agents primarily recommend whole insurance products even when our auditors' scripts were designed such that term insurance should be the optimal recommendation. In particular, the overwhelming majority of recommendations are for whole insurance. While we find that advice responds to various customer and regulatory features, none of our treatments strongly change the fact that overall advice in this market appears to be of very low quality.
Our experimental interventions study how advice responds to features of the customer interaction. In our first experiment, we test whether agent advice is responsive to customers' needs, as well as whether it responds to customers' (potentially erroneous) beliefs about products. We randomly assign whether term or whole life insurance is more suitable for consumers, as well as whether they express an initial preference for term or whole life. We therefore have cases in which the customer has an initial preference for term insurance, though whole insurance is the more suitable product, and vice versa (whole insurance could be a suitable product for an individual who has difficulty committing to saving). If an agent's only role is to match clients to suitable products, only suitability information should affect agent recommendations. In fact, we find that agents respond to both consumers' self-reported (and incorrect) beliefs in addition to consumers' needs. Interestingly, this is true even when the commission on the more suitable product is higher and, hence, the agent has a strong incentive to de-bias the customer. 2 We view this result as important because it suggests that agents tend to cater to, rather than de-bias, customers, even when sale of the suitable product would yield greater commissions. 3 
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One surprising finding is that agents choose to respond to different customer beliefs and needs by recommending a combination of term insurance and whole insurance as opposed to simply recommending the more suitable product. While it is difficult to rationalize combining term and whole insurance policies, based on a suitability criterion, such behavior does make sense if the agent is attempting to maximize commissions; an agent can obtain a high commission off the whole product and then satisfy the customer's desire for risk coverage by adding additional term coverage. We find that the premium amounts recommended are similar regardless of whether the agent's recommendation includes a term policy; however, the amounts of insurance coverage are much larger when term insurance is recommended. While it is difficult to objectively measure the right amount of coverage for any given consumer, the finding that agents focus on premium amounts, and hence recommend dramatically different levels of coverage for very similar individuals, is difficult to reconcile with the view that agents focus on the best product for consumers rather than their own commissions.
In our second experiment, we study whether agents respond differently to customers who report having previously received advice from another agent. We find that customers who report having visited another agent receive better advice when their previous advice was bad. While the experiment does not allow us to pin down the mechanismperhaps agents who perceive more competition are more likely to give advice, or perhaps agents simply decide to try a different tactic-we think this result provides motivation for future work on sales agent behavior.
In our third experiment, we test how disclosure regulation affects the quality of advice that life insurance agents provided. Mandating that agents disclose commissions has been a popular policy response to perceived misselling, as it makes potential conflicts of interest salient to consumers. 4 We take advantage of a natural experiment: as of July 1, 2010, the Indian insurance regulator mandated that insurance agents disclose the commissions they earned on equity-linked life insurance products. Focusing on audits occurring just before or just after the implementation of the regulation, we find agents are much less likely to propose the unit-linked insurance policy to clients and instead recommend whole life policies, which have higher, but opaque, commissions.
Overall, our results suggest an agency problem between life insurance customers and the agents who provide them advice. There are two potentially important drivers of this agency problem. The first, which the literature has primarily focused on, is that high commissions cause agents to recommend unsuitable products even when the agent knows what the suitable recommendation should be; in our context, this interpretation would suggest that agents know that term insurance dominates whole, but choose to recommend high-commission, less suitable, whole products. Another potentially important driver is that the high-commissions system selects agents who hold the mistaken belief that whole insurance products are indeed the more suitable ones (i.e., agents do not know that they are giving bad advice); agents with mistaken beliefs succeed in this market because those with correct beliefs may recommend lowercommission products and find it harder to stay in business. This second interpretation is interesting because it suggests that competition among life insurance agents will not cause the most knowledgeable agents to have success in the market. Our audits alone cannot distinguish these two interpretations because we observe only the advice agents give, as opposed to their true beliefs about the quality of various products.
To make some progress on this issue, we conducted a follow-up survey with 32 life insurance agents. We find that all surveyed agents own whole insurance policies themselves, which is consistent with the idea that the commissions structure may be selecting agents with mistaken beliefs. We also find some evidence that these agents recommend term insurance more when asked a hypothetical question about recommending products to a family member for whom term was suitable. Overall, these results suggest that commissions may be distorting advice through the incentives they provide to knowledgeable agents, as well as to the pressure they put on the system to select agents who believe unsuitable products are optimal. Understanding how commissions affect both of these channels is an interesting avenue for future theoretical and empirical research.
We focus on the market for life insurance in India for the following reasons. First, given the complexity of life insurance, consumers are likely to require help in making purchasing decisions. Second, popular press accounts suggest that the market may not function well: life insurance agents in India engage in unethical business practices, promising unrealistic returns or suggesting only high-commission products. 5 Third, the industry is large, with approximately $44 billion of premiums collected in the 2007-2008 financial year, 2.7 million insurance sales agents who collected approximately $3.73 billion in commissions in [2007] [2008] , and a 105 million insurance customers. Approximately 20% of household savings in India is invested in whole life insurance plans (IRDA, 2010) . Fourth, agent behavior is extremely important in this market, as approximately 90% of insurance purchasers buy through agents.
Our paper joins a recent literature that uses audit studies to collect data on advice and compares this advice to independent assessments of good advice. Oehler and Kohlert (2009) sent 90 mystery shoppers portraying varying levels of financial sophistication to German banks, documenting that those with greater sophistication received better advice. Synovate (2011) conducted 1,200 mystery shopping visits to financial advisors in 27 EU member states and argued that unsuitable advice was provided 60% of the time, though the authors of the study viewed a recommendation to invest in equities or mutual funds as unsuitable because it involves too much risk. 6 Mullainathan et al. (2012) conducted an audit study in the United States examining the quality of portfolio allocation guidance provided by advisors. They found that agents recommend higher-risk portfolios for wealthier individuals, are biased toward active management, and do not do a good job of undoing customer biases, instead catering to client preferences. 7 Relative to the existing literature, our paper makes the following contributions. Our focus on life insurance demonstrates the presence of a severe failure of the advice market beyond the single setting of portfolio management. This is important for several reasons. We show that agents recommend products that are strictly dominated (e.g., a violation of the law of one price), something more difficult to show in equity markets, where there is still debate about the merits of certain decisions (e.g., actively managed funds or momentum strategies). Our large sample size allows us to test a number of important comparative statics, and our followup studies help shed light on the extent to which poor advice reflects agents' misunderstanding of product features. Finally, because insurance products last 20 or more years, the setting we study may be largely free of incentives to establish a long-term relationship. Life insurance agents may view the relationship with a customer as essentially over after the product has been sold, whereas mutual fund agents may seek to maximize the lifetime value of the agent/client relationship.
Our results on the impact of disclosure norms are complementary to a few recent empirical papers as well. Bertrand and Morse (2011) find that disclosing the aggregate level of fees associated with payday borrowing reduces use of the product. Choi et al. (2009) find that providing cheat sheets that clearly disclose fees causes Harvard staff and Wharton MBA experimental subjects to slightly improve allocations 6 Such a definition of suitability is not consistent with standard theoretical predictions that an individual should hold diversified portfolios, including equities.
7 Theoretical models of advice predict that competition can remove the incentives of agents to provide poor advice. Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro (2007) found that competition between financial product intermediaries could lead to good advice in equilibrium, even if consumers did not know which products were suitable for them and brokers had incentives to mislead consumers. Gabaix and Laibson (2006 ), Carlin (2009 ), and Inderst and Ottaviani (2012a , 2012b , present models where bad advice can persist even in competitive equilibrium as long as the extra profits earned from providing bad advice to unsophisticated consumers outweigh gains in market share from providing good advice. A second, nonaudit, strand of work tests for agency problems between financial agents and customers by comparing broker versus nonbroker intermediated transactions. Levitt and Syverson (2008) show that real estate agents do a better job selling their own homes than their clients' homes. Bergstresser, Chalmers, and Tufano (2009) find that mutual funds sold through brokers underperform those sold through other distribution channels, even before accounting for substantially higher fees. Del Guercio, Reuter, and Tkac (2010) argue that sellers of mutual fund products in the United States that charge high fees may provide intangible financial services that investors value. across index funds, but find overall that disclosure has only minor impacts. In laboratory settings, Cain, Loewenstein, and Moore (2005) find that disclosure leads to worse advice, perhaps because advisors feel that disclosure gives them a license to exaggerate claims, and De Meza, Irlenbusch, and Reyniers (2010) find limited behavioral changes among insurance purchasers in response to disclosure.
II. Life Insurance Policies in India
In this section, we provide a summary of our comparison of term versus whole products. A detailed analysis is presented in the online appendix in table A1. We find that the insurance offerings from the largest insurance company in India violate the law of one price as long as an individual has access to a means of saving.
The value of whole policies is limited for several reasons. While the coverage amount increases each year due to "bonuses," these bonuses are not compounded. Hence, instead of purchasing expensive whole insurance policies, customers may purchase cheaper term policies, save the difference, and earn substantially higher benefits. We evaluate the whole versus term-plus-savings strategy for both the Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC), the governmentowned firm with the largest market share, and ICICI Pru, a private insurer. The numbers are given in table A1. For a 35-year-old man, the term-plus-savings bundle with LIC products yields 42% greater benefits if a customer dies at age 35; if a customer lives to age 80, this product yields 21% greater payout. For the ICICI Pru ten-year endowment policy, a term-plus-savings strategy yields between 10 times as much coverage (for an early death), to 23% more cash (if the customer survives ten years).
But even this comparison understates the difference in value for at least two reasons. First, the replicating portfolio builds up a substantial savings balance, which is more liquid than a life insurance policy. Clients seeking to redeem investment-type policies early may forfeit more than 70% of the accrued value. Second, if an individual does not pay each premium promptly, the insurance company has the right to declare the policy lapsed. Some estimates suggest lapse rates are as high as 6% of outstanding policies lapse in a given year (Kumar, 2009 ). Gottlieb and Smetters (2014) attribute lapses of American policies with high net present value to unanticipated liquidity shocks. Lapse within three years yields no redemption value to the customer; lapses after three years promise a recovery value of only 30% of premiums paid (less the first year's premiums). Halan, Sane, and Thomas (2013) estimate Indian consumers lost over $28 billion to lapsed life insurance products from 2004 to 2012.
Thus, for an equivalent investment, the buyer receives anywhere from 40% to twenty times as much benefit if she purchases term plus savings, relative to an endowment or whole policy. A benchmark might be the mutual fund industry: $1 invested in a minimal fee S&P500 fund might earn 8% per annum and therefore be worth $69 after 55 years.
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If an investor invested $1 in a "high-cost" mutual fund that charged 2% in fees, the value after 55 years would be $25, or about one-third as large. The cost of making a poor life insurance decision is thus similar in magnitude to selecting the highest-cost index funds.
When making similar comparisons for products offered by other companies or for individuals of different ages, we consistently find that term-plus-savings outperforms savings-linked life insurance plans. This finding appears to hold in the United States as well: Carney and Graham (1998) examine term versus whole policies in the United States and also conclude that "buying term and investing the difference" would have better payoffs than buying whole insurance in most instances. A more recent, nonacademic, comparison in Blyskal (2015) argues that for most consumers, term insurance is appropriate. One exception is in the case where whole insurance purchasers can follow through and continue to make payments for twenty years or more. In this case whole insurance may be appropriate for some consumers because of certain tax treatments. 8 We note that if there is truly rational demand for investment-linked products, it is somewhat surprising that an insurance company has not entered this market and won a substantial amount of business by offering a better whole insurance product (i.e., by paying compounded bonuses, charging lower premiums, or both). In fact, a few policies offer compounded bonuses, but these do not seem to have won substantial market share.
Companies regard insurance commission rates as proprietary information and do not, to our knowledge, voluntarily disclose them. We were able to obtain insurance commission information from LIC, the largest company in our sample, as well as a leading private insurance company (LIC agents comprise 64% of our sample). LIC agents receive 35% of the premium collected in the first year of a policy as commission. For the policies described in the appendix (a whole policy providing Rs 2.5 million face value of coverage, and a term policy providing Rs 3.5 million, the total payment to an agent the first year she sold the policies would be drastically different: selling the whole policy would yield over three times as much compensation to the agent (Rs 24,500) as would selling term (Rs 6,700). 9 One explanation for this may be that competition really occurs along the margin of selling effort as opposed to the quality of the product. In this case, the products that have the highest sales incentives will sell, and an insurance firm will have an incentive to pay the highest commissions on the highest-profit products. We present a formal model along these lines that is consistent with our empirical results in the appendix to this paper. Work on shrouded product attributes (Gabaix & Laibson, 2006; Heidhues, Koszegi, & Murooka, forthcoming) may also provide part of the explanation. These models show that dominated products can exist in competitive equilibrium. In the life insurance case, firms may not have an incentive to educate consumers that term plus savings is better than whole insurance, as consumers may move savings from insurance firms to other financial service providers. This loss may outweigh the benefits of greater term insurances sales. Nonetheless, because our experimental design does not allow us to distinguish between these models, we leave further exploration of this issue to future work.
A. Whole Life Insurance as a Commitment Device
One potential advantage of the whole life policy over term-plus savings is that the whole life policy contains commitment features that some consumers value (Ashraf, Karlan, & Yin, 2006) ; whole policies return no or significantly reduced benefits if customers allow them to lapse. However, it is not clear that the commitment feature is sufficient to make these policies desirable. First, the relative price of savings in whole insurance is very high, with a simple calibration in the online appendix suggesting a sophisticated hyperbolic consumer would have to have a high immediate discount rate (β = .4), relative to the range of values typically cited in the literature (e.g., Angeletos et al., 2001 , use β = .7).
Moreover, demand for commitment products appears to be low: Ashraf et al. (2006) find that only 25% of those offered a commitment savings device choose it; Gine, Karlan, and Zinman (2010) report even lower take-up rates for related commitment contracts and savings products. Other savings products in the Indian context offer similar commitment device properties but substantially higher returns, such as fixed deposit accounts in banks or the universally available public provident fund (which makes funds available only after seven years). Finally, there is no reason that a financial services provider could not offer commitment savings accounts without an insurance component, yet we know of no such product offered by any financial services provider in India.
To minimize the possibility that agents believe consumers require a commitment savings product, for any shopping visit in which we regard term insurance as the more appropriate product, the mystery shopper made it clear to the insurance agent that she or he was seeking risk coverage at a low cost rather than a savings vehicle. We also note that our measures of agents' response to the needs, beliefs, and competition of customers do not rely on whole being a dominated product for everyone, only that our experimental treatments move the agent's beliefs about this particular auditor's beliefs and needs related to insurance.
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III. Theoretical Framework and Predictions
Our empirical work is motivated by recent theoretical work on the provision of advice to potential customers. Our paper tests two types of predictions that arise from this class of models. The first set of predictions concerns the quality of advice provided by commissions-motivated agents. These models predict that at least some consumers will receive lowquality advice encouraging a complicated product that has higher commissions but no real benefits to them (Inderst & Ottaviani, 2012c; Gabaix & Laibson, 2006) . 10 We test this by measuring the fraction of agents who recommend that customers purchase whole insurance, even when the customer is seeking insurance only for risk protection.
Agents might indeed provide useful advice to customers, for a number of reasons, such as regulatory scrutiny, with the insurance regulator in India providing fines up to US $200,000 (see Halan et al., 2013 , for more detail). Second, sophisticated consumers who believe they are receiving bad advice may decline to purchase from agents, resulting in no commission for the agent (and the agent may not have a good sense of whether the customer is sophisticated). There are over 3 million insurance agents in India, making agent switching highly plausible (Anagol et al., 2014) . Moreover, agents may value a satisfied customer for both cross-selling opportunities and word-of-mouth recommendations. Finally, the dominant life insurance company, LIC, is state-owned, with a mission to serve the interests of the "community" and "national priorities and obligations" (LIC, 2012) . LIC agents may therefore be expected to provide high-quality advice and, given its dominant position, influence the overall market.
The second set of predictions relates to how regulation and customer types affect the quality of advice. A key feature of the recent theoretical models in Inderst and Ottaviani (2012c) and Gabaix and Laibson (2006) is the presence of two types of customers, with different levels of sophistication. Inderst and Ottaviani (2012c) predict that these sophisticated customers will receive better advice. We explore these forces in several ways. We systematically vary a salient feature of customer type, which is whether the customer has met with and received a recommendation from another agent in the post. We complement these experiments with another, reported in the appendix, in which customers selfreport having either high or low levels of sophistication: we find that more sophisticated customers receive better advice.
10 While Gabaix and Laibson (2006) do not explicitly deal with commissions, they do show that firms will not necessarily have the incentive to unshroud product attributes (such as commissions or low rates of return in our case) because unshrouding these will not necessarily win the firm business. In our case, the analogy would be that life insurance firms do not have the incentive to unshroud these attributes of whole insurance products because they would lose a substantial proportion of business to banks and other financial service providers if individuals move their savings out of life insurance.
Prior work in economics predicts that competition between firms will induce firms to disclose all relevant information regarding products (Jovanovic, 1982) . In these models, mandatory disclosure enforced by the government does not change consumer decisions and does not improve welfare. However, Inderst and Ottaviani (2012c) argue that disclosure requirements can improve the quality of advice by essentially converting unaware customers into customers who are aware of how commissions can bias advice. We test how a disclosure requirement on commissions affects financial advice by studying a particular type of insurance product, a unit linked insurance policy (ULIP), where agents after July 1, 2010, were forced to disclose the commissions they earned.
IV. Experimental Design
In this section we describe the basic experimental setup common to all experiments we ran in this study. Auditors were recruited through the employee networks of the Center for Microfinance (CMF), with the goal of recruiting reliable, capable individuals who would be able to conduct the audits effectively. The auditors had at least a high school education, were predominantly middle-aged men (in their late 30s), and spoke the local language. 11 The audit team was led by a full-time audit manager, who had previously managed a financial product sales team for an international bank. This employee, along with a principal investigator, provided intensive introductory training on life insurance. Each auditor was subsequently trained in the specific scripts they were to follow when meeting with the agents. Each script was customized to match the auditor's true-life situation (e.g., number of children, place of residence). However, auditors were given uniform and consistent language to use when asking about insurance products and seeking recommendations. Scripts were memorized. The auditors and their manager were told neither the purpose of the study nor the specific hypotheses we sought to test. Auditors were instructed not to lie during any of the sessions. The audit process was designed to mimic customer behavior as much as possible and allow our auditors to act naturally. The audits scripts were written by a former life insurance salesperson, with the goal of representing typical transactions.
We ran a series of experiments to understand under what circumstances advice might improve. In each experiment, treatments were randomly assigned to auditors and auditors to agents. Table 1 presents the number of audits, number of auditors, and number of life insurance agents for each separate treatment cell in each of our three experiments. Since we were identifying agents as the experiment proceeded, we 6 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS This table contains audit counts from our three experiments, disaggregated by treatment combinations. The first column provides the total number of audits for each treatment combination, the second column provides the total number of auditors involved for each treatment combination, and the third column provides the number of distinct agents visited for each treatment combination. The fourth column indicates the mean of the main dependent variable, by treatment assignment, for each experiment. "Quality of advice" refers to the experiment where we varied the auditor's needs and beliefs and the source of their beliefs (competing agent or friend). "Disclosure" refers to the experiment where we varied whether the auditor made a disclosure inquiry, both before and after the mandatory disclosure law, to test the law's effect on agent behavior. "Sophistication" refers to the experiment where we varied the auditors' expressed financial sophistication.
a Since agents may have been visited by more than one auditor, the number of agents visited is less than the total number of audits.
randomized in daily batches. To ensure treatment fidelity, auditors were assigned to use only one particular treatment script on a given day. 12 Table 1 also reports the mean of the primary outcome variable by treatment. Life insurance agents were identified by a number of different sources, most of them websites with national listings of life insurance agents. 13 Contact procedures were identical across the treatments. While some agents were visited more than once, care was taken to ensure that no auditor visited the same agent twice and to space any repeat visits at least four weeks apart to reduce the chance that the agent would learn of the study. At the experiments' conclusion, auditors were offered a bonus that they could use toward purchasing their chosen life insurance plan. 14 Table 2 presents summary statistics across the three experiments on whose results we report in this paper. The quality-of-advice experiment was conducted in one major Indian city, and the disclosure and sophistication experiments were conducted in a second major Indian city. 15 Across the experiments, between 50% and 73% of agents visited sold policies underwritten by the LIC. This fraction is consistent with LIC's market share, which was 66% of 12 We cluster standard errors by auditor-day in our regression analysis. 13 See online appendix 4 for details. 14 At the completion of the sophistication and disclosure experiments, auditors were offered bonuses of Rs 5,000 to use toward paying the premiums on a life insurance product. All chose a term policy, through LIC, with a risk cover of Rs 650,000 to Rs 750,000 rupees. 15 The shopping behavior experiment was conducted as a subtreatment within the quality-of-advice experiment and thus shares the same summary statistics.
total premiums collected in 2010. On average, each audit lasted about 35 minutes, suggesting that these audits represent substantial interactions between our auditors and the insurance agents.
We took great care to address threats to internal validity. 16 To deter fraud, agents were obliged to hand in business cards of the sales agents. To monitor script compliance, we paid an insurance agent within the principal investigators' social network to "audit the auditors"-these agents reported that our auditors adhered to scripts. The outcome we measure, which policy was recommended, is relatively straightforward, and auditors were instructed to ask the agent for a specific recommendation. 17 To avoid auditor demand effects, we did not inform the auditors of the hypotheses we were interested in testing.
V. Quality of Advice: Catering to Beliefs versus Needs
In this experiment, we test the sensitivity of agents' recommendations to the actual needs of consumers, as well as to consumers' potentially incorrect beliefs about which product is more appropriate for them. In particular, one reason that agents may recommend whole insurance is a belief that customers will value the commitment savings features. To examine this, we vary the expressed need of the agent 16 Audit studies that use matched pairs to detect discrimination (e.g., Ayres & Siegelman, 1995) have drawn criticism (Heckman, 1998) ; our study does not use this approach.
17 Agents sought to close a sale on the first visit rather than suggesting a follow-up visit. This table presents summary statistics from our three experiments. "Quality of advice" refers to the experiment where we varied the auditor's needs (savings versus risk), beliefs (whole versus term), and the source of their beliefs (competing agent or friend). "Disclosure" refers to the experiment where we varied whether the auditor made a disclosure inquiry, both before and after the mandatory disclosure law, to test the law's effect on agent behavior. "Sophistication" refers to the experiment where we varied the auditors' expressed financial sophistication. "LIC" refers to the Life Insurance Corporation of India, a government-owned insurance company that has the largest share of insurers in the country.
by assigning them one of two treatments. In one set of the audits, the auditor signals a need for a whole insurance policy by stating; "I want to save and invest money for the future, and I also want to make sure my wife and children will be taken care of if I die. I do not have the discipline to save on my own." Good advice under this treatment might plausibly constitute the agent's recommending whole insurance. In the other half of the audits, the auditor signals a need for term insurance by stating; "I am worried that if I die early, my wife and kids will not be able to live comfortably or meet our financial obligations. I want to cover that risk at an affordable cost." By comparing agent recommendations across these two groups, we can measure whether an agent's recommendation responds to a customer's true needs. Appendix table A2 presents the exact wording of all of the experimental treatments in this study.
To understand the role of shopping behavior, we also varied the source auditors mentioned when talking about their beliefs. In the "no-shopped-around" treatment, the auditor named a friend as a source of the advice. In the shoppedaround treatment, the auditor said the suggestion had come from another agent from whom the auditor was considering purchasing.
We also randomized the customer's stated beliefs about which product was appropriate for him or her. In audits where the auditor was to convey a belief that whole insurance was the correct product, the auditor would state, "I have heard from [source] that whole insurance is a really good product for me. Maybe we should explore that further." In the audits where the auditor was to convey a belief that term insurance was the correct product for him or her, the auditor would state, "I have heard from [source] that term insurance is a really good product for me. Maybe we should explore that further."
We correspondingly measured how agents responded to these different representations. Our treatments were designed to be reasonable and representative of what customers might say. Nonetheless, stronger or weaker statements may have different effect sizes, and there is no obvious way to compare the strength of a statement of need to the strength of a statement of bias. We therefore focus primarily on the qualitative nature of behavior changes these statements induce rather than making quantitative comparisons of the effects of different treatments. Each of these three treatments (product need, product belief, and source of information) was assigned orthogonally, so this experiment has eight treatment groups.
Appendix table A3 presents a randomization check to see if there are important differences in the audits that were randomized into different groups. We include audit location fixed effects in our specifications; they do not substantially change the results.
Before describing the experimental results, we emphasize how poor the quality of advice is: for individuals for whom term is the more suitable product, only 5% of agents recommend purchasing only term insurance, while 75% recommend purchasing only whole. A previous version of this paper documented a range of wildly incorrect statements made by agents, such as; "You want term. Are you planning on killing yourself?"; "Term insurance is not for women"; and "Term insurance is for government employees only." One even proposed a policy that he described as term insurance that was in fact whole insurance. Table 3 presents our main results on how variations in the needs of customers and biases of customers affect the quality of financial advice. 18 Column 1 presents results on whether the agent's final recommendation included a term insurance policy (in about 18% of the cases, agents recommend that the consumer purchase multiple products). We find that agents are 10 percentage points more likely to make a final recommendation that includes a term insurance policy if the auditor states that he or she has heard that term insurance is a good product. We also find that agents are 12 percentage points more likely to make a recommendation that includes a term insurance policy if the auditor says he or she is looking for low-cost risk coverage. Both results are statistically significant at the 1% level. However, it is important to note that 8 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS This table reports regressions where the dependent variables are the (exclusive) presence of term insurance in the agent's recommendation in columns 1-4. The dependent variable is the logarithm of risk coverage recommended in columns 5 and 6 and of premium amount recommended in columns 7 and 8. The main independent variables are whether the auditor expressed a bias for term, whether the auditor expressed a genuine need for term, and an interaction between these two variables. The bias for term is expressed through an auditor's explicit stated preference for term, while a need for term is expressed by the auditor mentioning his or her desire to cover risk at an affordable cost (as opposed to the need for whole, which is expressed by wanting to save and invest and not feeling self-disciplined enough to do it on one's own). Dummy variables for venue location (agent office is the omitted category), whether the agent was selling insurance from a government underwriter, and auditor fixed effects are also included in columns 2, 4, 6, and 8. There are fewer observations in columns 5 and 6 than those in columns 1 and 2 because agents did not recommend specific levels of coverage in eighteen audits. Standard errors, clustered at the auditor-calendar day level, in parentheses: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, and ***p < 0.01. the interaction of these two variables is statistically insignificant; agents do not respond more to a customer's need for term insurance when the customer has already said that term insurance is a good product for him or her (and vice versathe agent does not respond more strongly to the customer having a belief that term is a good product if the customer states the need for risk coverage).
In column 2, we add auditor-fixed effects and controls for venue and whether the agent sells policies underwritten by a government-owned insurer. The experimental results are unaffected. Agents from the government-owned insurance underwriters (primarily LIC) are 12 percentage points less likely to recommend a term insurance plan as part of their recommendation. This result suggests that the government does not encourage its sales agents to provide better advice and that government ownership does not appear to solve the problem of unsuitable advice in this context. 19 Column 3 presents the same specification as column 1; however, now the dependent variable takes a value of 1 if the agent recommended only a term insurance plan. We find much weaker results here. A customer stating that he or she has heard that term insurance is a good product is only 2 percentage points more likely to receive a recommendation to purchase only term insurance. We find that stating a need for 19 There are multiple possible explanations for our finding that the government does not provide better advice. Anecdotal evidence suggests that low-and middle-income households tend to trust the government insurance companies more than private sector firms, and the government firm might take advantage of this additional trust by pushing less suitable products. Another possibility is that agents employed by government firms are less knowledgeable about term insurance. Our experimental design does not allow us to distinguish between these explanations. affordable risk coverage causes only a 1.5 percentage point increase in the probability that the agent will recommend term insurance exclusively. This effect is not statistically significant at conventional levels. When the auditor states both that he or she needs risk coverage and has heard that term is a good product, we find an increase of 5.3 percentage points, significant at the 10% level. Column 4 adds controls.
Thus, in a comparison of columns 2 and 4, it appears that agents do respond to both the biases and needs of customers; however, they do so primarily by recommending term insurance products as an addition to whole insurance products rather than recommending the purchase of term exclusively. Overall, these results are consistent with the idea that agents maximize the expected revenue from an interaction, and the expected revenue depends on both the probability that the customer will purchase and the amount of commission that can be earned. When choosing what product to recommend, agents face a trade-off between recommending a product with higher commissions versus recommending a product that fits the customer's preexisting beliefs. 20 Agents do not attempt to debias customers who express perceived needs inconsistent with actual needs; thus, in this context, it seems unlikely that commissions-motivated agents are effective in undoing behavioral biases that customers bring to their insurance purchase decisions.
Columns 5 and 6 show that stating an initial bias toward term insurance causes the agent to recommend that the customer purchase approximately 14% more risk coverage, while expressing a need for risk coverage increases the recommended risk coverage by 19%. 21 Both of these effects are significant at the 5% level, but their interaction is not. Again, these results suggest that agents will cater to the stated preferences of a customer even if the agent receives a signal that those stated preferences are inconsistent with the customer's needs. 22 Columns 7 and 8 test whether the recommended premium amounts are statistically different across the treatments. We find that the bias and need treatments have small and statistically insignificant effects on the level of premiums the agent recommends that customers pay to purchase insurance. This suggests that although agents are recommending higher coverage levels for those who have either a bias toward term or a need for term (columns 5 and 6), customers are not paying higher premiums to obtain this additional coverage. Instead, the increase in risk coverage observed in columns 5 and 6 is due primarily to the fact that term insurance provides dramatically more risk coverage per rupee of premium.
Further evidence of this interpretation is obtained from the average amounts of risk coverage and premium amounts when agents recommended term versus whole insurance (appendix table A4). The table shows the amount of premium recommended and the number of years of replacement income the coverage amount represents (based on a monthly income of Rs 15,000, the amount our auditors conveyed in the audits). We find that in the majority of cases when an agent recommended term insurance (i.e., when he or she combined it with a whole policy in the "any term" category), the recommendation was for a total premium level that is very similar to the amount suggested when recommending only whole policies. The years of income replacement, however, are much larger when a term policy is recommended. While we cannot say with certainty what the optimal level of coverage might be, most reasonable people would agree that 11 to 15 years of replacement income is more likely appropriate than only 2.9 to 3.4 years. These results suggest that agents are primarily targeting premiums (and therefore commissions) instead of targeting how much insurance a customer needs. Our finding here is consistent with anecdotal evidence from discussions with our auditing team: agents typically start the life insurance conversation by estimating how much the individual can afford to put into life insurance per month rather than determining how much risk coverage the customer needs. 23 21 Since the dependent variables here are logged, the coefficients in columns 5 and 6 of table 3 are exponentiated to get these effect sizes. 22 This coverage increase is concentrated in the term insurance increase. When we regress total term coverage on our treatments, the coefficients on need term and biased toward term are positive and significant. However, when we use the level of whole coverage, the point estimates for these same treatments are actually negative and statistically insignificant. 23 Such an interpretation is consistent with the idea that anchoring is an important feature of conversations between financial product providers and consumers. Agents anchor customers on the amount of premiums they can pay as opposed to the amount of coverage they need. By shifting the discussion toward amounts of premiums and away from coverage amounts,
We cannot observe what an agent infers from our experimental treatments. For example, it is possible that agents hearing a customer say that he or she heard term insurance is a good product infer that the customer needs only risk coverage or an agent who hears that a customer has heard that whole insurance is a good product assumes that the customer needs a commitment savings device. While we acknowledge that such an interpretation is possible, we do not believe it substantially changes our results. We find that agents respond equally to the "beliefs" treatments whether or not the beliefs contradict the direct statement of needs (the interaction between the "beliefs" and "needs" treatments are insignificant). If agents were primarily using our beliefs treatments as a way to make inferences about customer needs, then we would expect them to respond to beliefs less strongly when they contradict the customer's stated needs.
In summary, we find the following. Despite the fact that term is an objectively better policy, the vast majority of our visits end with a recommendation that the customer purchase whole life insurance. Second, even when customers signal that they are most interested in term insurance and need risk coverage, 79% of audits result in whole insurance being recommended. Third, we find that agents primarily cater to customers (either their beliefs or needs) by recommending that they purchase term insurance in addition to whole insurance, as opposed to recommending term insurance alone. It is difficult to see how combining term and whole insurance makes sense for someone who is seeking risk coverage.
VI. Financial Advice and Market Structure
Our previous results are consistent with the models of Inderst and Ottaviani (2012c), Gabaix and Laibson (2006) , and Bolton et al. (2007) , which suggest that commissionsmotivated sales agents will have an incentive to recommend more complicated but potentially unsuitable products to customers who are not wary of the agency problems that commissions create (at least under some market structures). In this section, we turn to testing theoretical predictions on how advice responds to the regulatory and market structure.
A. Shopping Behavior and Financial Advice
In any given interaction between an agent and a customer, it is likely that the agent perceives that he has some market power, as finding another agent may represent a hassle for a customer. In this treatment, we attempted to experimentally reduce the agent's perceived amount of market power by varying whether the customer mentions having spoken to another agent. Accordingly, in one set of treatments, the auditor stated having heard from another agent that term (or whole) might be a good product for him or her; in another the agent can avoid the fact that term insurance provides much more risk coverage for the same premium amounts versus whole insurance. This table reports regressions where the dependent variables are the (exclusive) presence of term insurance in the agent's recommendation. The main independent variable is Shopped Around (the main effect and the interactions with bias and need), which is signaled in an audit in two ways: first, by the auditor's mentioning meeting with other providers and, second, by the auditor's stating a preference based on advice from another agent. Dummy variables for venue location (agent office is the omitted category), whether the agent was selling insurance from a government underwriter, and auditor fixed effects are also included in even-numbered columns. Standard errors, clustered at the auditor-calendar day level, in parentheses: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, and ***p < 0.01. set, the auditor stated having heard from a friend that term (or whole) might be a good product for him or her.
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The audits on which these data are based are the same as those used in the quality-of-advice experiment. Table 4 presents our results on the impact of this variation in shopping behavior on the quality of advice provided by life insurance agents. The specifications reported here are the same as those in table 3, but we now introduce a dummy variable (Shopped Around) that takes the value of 1 if the auditor's bias came from a competing agent and 0 if the bias came from a friend. Columns 1 and 2 show that, overall, having received advice from another agent does not seem to have an important effect on whether agents recommend term insurance as part of their package recommendation. Columns 5 and 6 show that treatments where advice came from another agent also did not have an overall increasing effect on whether only a term policy was recommended.
Columns 3 and 4 introduce a set of interaction terms among the bias treatment, the need treatment, and the Shopped Around treatment (agent versus friend). We are particularly interested in the treatment where the customer is biased toward whole insurance but demonstrates a need for term insurance. In this setting; the agent has the potential to debias the auditor, whose beliefs are inconsistent with his or her insurance needs. In columns 3 and 4, we find that the agent is substantially more likely to de-bias customers when the customer's advice came from another agent. 24 While it is difficult to interpret the meaning of the 13% coefficient without knowing how much this treatment moved the priors of agents, we can reject the null hypothesis that an additional signal that the customer has shopped around has no effect at the 5% level.
We do not, however, find that receiving advice from another agent increases the possibility that agents will debias customers who have a belief that term insurance is a good product but need help with savings. We find that the coefficient on the interaction (Bias = Term) × Shopped Around is small and statistically insignificant.
Columns 7 and 8 report the same specification as those in columns 3 and 4; however, the dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the agent recommended that the customer purchase only term insurance. We do not find any evidence that agents attempt to de-bias consumers by recommending that they purchase only term insurance. The coefficient on the interaction term (Need = Term) × Shopped Around is small and insignificant in columns 7 and 8. We find that the effect of receiving advice from another agent is effective in this case only when the auditor has both a bias and a need toward term insurance. One interpretation of this result is that agents assume that a customer who has the knowledge to know that term insurance is the better product for someone who needs risk coverage is almost surely going to purchase term insurance from the other agent. Thus, the agent in the audit chooses to compete by recommending only a term insurance purchase as well.
To help understand the mechanism through which our shopping behavior treatment works, we present in appendix figure 1 the fraction of audits that result in a term recommendation across treatment assignments. Importantly, agents are not generally more likely to recommend term when an auditor has spoken to another agent. Thus, shopping around does not seem to be a signal of self-control or sophistication. Indeed, having met with another agent has an effect only when the auditor believed that whole insurance was a good product but also mentioned needing risk coverage. In this treatment, agents can demonstrate competence by recommending a product that the other agent did not recommend. However, it is also possible that the agent decided to try a different recommendation in these cases because the customer chose not to buy based on the previous agent's recommendation. Our current setting does not let us distinguish the de-biasing effect of competition from this alternative interpretation.
It is also important to note that our treatment was designed to understand how agents respond to customers for whom there will likely be more competition from other agents, not to understand how the quality of advice might change if the entire industry became more competitive. For example, greater competition among insurers might result in different insurance products being offered or changes in the equilibrium commission structure. 25 
B. Disclosure
On July 1, 2010, the Indian insurance regulator mandated that insurance agents must disclose the commissions they would earn when selling a specific type of whole insurance product called a ULIP. ULIPs are very similar to whole insurance policies, except that the savings component is invested in equity instruments with uncertain returns. This regulation was enacted as the insurance regulator faced criticism from the Indian stock market regulator that ULIPs should be regulated in the same way as other equity-based investment products. The insurance regulator responded to these criticisms by requiring agents to disclose commissions when selling ULIPs.
Prior to July 1, agents were required to disclose total charges (i.e., total costs, including commissions) but not required to specifically disclose how much of those charges were commissions; after July 1, both total costs and commissions were required to be disclosed. The policy experiment therefore gave customers more information on the agency problem between self and the agent, without changing the cost, or information about total costs, of the policy. This allows us to interpret our results as the effect of better information about agency rather than better information about costs more generally.
To focus the visits on ULIPs, agents began by inquiring specifically about ULIP products available. The experimental design here involves two components. First, we conducted audits before and after this legal change to test whether the behavior of agents would change due to the fact that they were forced to disclose commissions. Second, we randomly assigned each of these audits into two groups: in one group, the auditor conveys knowledge of commissions, and in the other group the auditor does not mention commissions. We created these two treatments because we believed only customers who have some awareness of these commissions were likely to be affected by this law change. In one group, we had the auditor explicitly mention that he or she was knowledgeable about commissions by asking; "Can you give me more information about the commission charges I'll be paying?" In the control group, the auditor did not ask this question about commission charges. The variable Disclosure Inquiry takes a value of 1 in the audits where the auditor explicitly mentioned commissions. Table 5 presents summary statistics on the disclosure experiment audits. Column 1 pertains to the full sample audits, while columns 2 and 3 present summary statistics on the audits before and after the regulation went into effect. There are several differences between the preand postaudits. In particular, postdisclosure change audits were more likely to be conducted with LIC, they were slightly longer, and the meetings took place in different venues. These differences suggest that caution is warranted when comparing the pre-and postresults. Columns 7 and 8 of appendix table A3 present summary statistics on the randomization of the different levels of knowledge about commissions.
Did the disclosure requirement change products recommended?. We first examine whether audits conducted after the disclosure requirements went into effect were less likely to result in the agent recommending a ULIP policy. Appendix figure 2 shows the weekly average fraction of audits that resulted in a ULIP recommendation. Prior to the commissions disclosure reform, agents recommended ULIPs 80% to 90% of the time. Following the reform, there is an immediate and discrete drop in the fraction recommending ULIPs, to between 40% and 65% of audits. The discrete drop suggests the observed differences are driven by the disclosure requirement rather than being attributable to a steady downtrend trend in the fraction of agents recommending ULIP policies over time. This table presents summary statistics from the disclosure experiment disaggregated by timing. They are used to perform a balance check, univariate regressions (with standard errors clustered at the auditorcalendar day level) of the treatment on each independent variable. Significant differences are denoted by asterisks. Standard errors, clustered at the auditor-calendar day level, in parentheses. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, and ***p < 0.01. Table 6 presents the formal empirical results. The dependent variable in columns 1 to 4 takes a value of 1 if the agents recommended a ULIP product and 0 otherwise. The independent variable Post Disclosure indicates whether the audit occurred after the legislation went into effect on July 1 (our earliest postdisclosure audits occurred on July 2). The variable Disclosure Inquiry equals 1 where the client expresses awareness that agents receive commissions and 0 otherwise. Finally, we control for the location of the audit and use auditor fixed effects.
Column 1 presents a regression without controls. We find that in the postperiod, a ULIP product was 23 percentage points less likely to be recommended. We do not find the randomized treatment of the auditor demonstrating knowledge of the commissions significant (Disclosure Inquiry), nor do we find the interaction to be significant. Because the composition of agents shifts over time, we control in column 2 for whether the agent works for a government-run insurance company, as well as location and auditor fixed effects. The point estimate is slightly smaller, but the effect is still quite sizable at 17 percentage points.
In columns 3 and 4, we examine agents for governmentowned and private insurance companies separately. Among those selling policies underwritten by government-owned companies, there is a 26 percentage point decrease in the likelihood of recommending a ULIP policy after the disclosure law becomes effective, suggesting that the change in share of LIC agents does not affect our results. Among private underwriters, we find a negative point estimate, although the coefficient is not significant at standard levels.
Columns 5 and 6 show that the disclosure rule does not result in better financial advice: agents are no more likely to recommend term insurance. Instead, the disclosure requirement primarily causes them to substitute away from ULIPs and toward whole insurance. The point estimate, .17, is consistent with complete substitution from ULIPs to whole insurance.
In terms of magnitude, given that the overall percentage of ULIP recommendations in this sample was 72%, the approximately 20% decrease in ULIP recommendations once disclosure commission became mandatory is an economically large effect. The ULIP disclosure law change primarily led to substitution away from high-commission ULIP products to high-commission whole insurance products.
Turning to the experimental treatment, we do not find that audits where our agents showed knowledge of the new disclosure requirements are associated with lower levels of ULIP recommendations or with recommended levels of risk coverage or premium amounts.
The natural experiment we study here is a policy that required only disclosure for one specific high-commission product and shows that agents may attempt to avoid this disclosure. It provides less insight on what the effect might be of a more general policy change mandating commissions disclosure on all insurance policies, though the very fact that agents substituted away from ULIPs suggests that regulations can change agent behavior.
C. Do Agents Know They Are Giving Bad Advice?
A limitation of our audit methodology is that while we do observe agent recommendations and how they react and respond to customer behavior, we do not measure agent beliefs or preferences directly. An open question, therefore, is to what extent agents actually know that they are giving bad advice. The answer is important for how we understand equilibrium in markets for product information. If agents do know the correct advice, then this suggests that commissions may be distorting their incentives and causing them to provide unsuitable advice. However, if agents do not know what constitutes good advice, then this opens the possibility that the commissions system or some other mechanism somehow selects and retains agents who have mistaken beliefs about the quality of different products in this industry.
From February to May 2014, we conducted a survey of insurance agents to gain additional insight into their beliefs about product quality. We conducted these interviews at the same site as our disclosure experiments. We chose sixteen agents from LIC and sixteen agents from other providers using the same process as in our life insurance experiment. Surveys were conducted in person by our This table reports regressions where the dependent variable is a binary equal to 1 if any ULIP product is recommended for columns 1-4. The dependent variable in columns 5 and 6 is whether a term policy was recommended or a whole policy was recommended, respectively. The dependent variables in columns 7 and 8 are, respectively, the logarithm of the risk coverage and premium of the recommended policy. The ULIP product is the product where disclosure of commissions was made mandatory on July 1, 2010. The main independent variables are whether the audit occurred after the commissions disclosure law came into effect (postdisclosure), whether the auditor made an explicit commission disclosure inquiry, and an interaction between these two variables. Dummy variables for venue location (agent office is omitted), whether the agent is selling insurance from a government-owned insurer, and auditor fixed effects are in even-numbered columns. Standard errors, clustered at the auditor-calendar day level, in parentheses. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, and ***p < 0.01. head surveyor and lasted around thirty minutes; agents were compensated for their time. Our surveyor did not explicitly mention the previous audit studies and was never asked about them. The agents were told we were interviewing them "to better understand agent-consumer interactions, particularly agent advice to consumers, in the Indian life insurance market."
We focus on two results from this survey. The first is that nearly all agents report personally owning a whole insurance policy while only 50% own term insurance. This is consistent with the idea that we observe such poor advice in our audits because many agents actually believe that whole insurance is a better product. 26 If this is true, then it raises the question of why the competitive insurance market in India does not lead to the most knowledgeable agents succeeding and driving low-knowledge agents out of business-an example of a failure in the market for information. One hypothesis is that competition selects agents with the best sales skills as opposed to the most knowledge about insurance products. We believe this hypothesis is interesting because it suggests a reason why concerns for fairness do not limit the amount of bad advice that life insurance agents give. Agents may actually believe they are giving good advice 26 It is possible that they may purchase whole insurance as a sales technique, so they can credibly tell clients, "This is the same policy I purchased for my family." But agents could also just lie to customers and say they had purchased whole insurance for themselves; the fact that they own whole policies themselves likely signals some belief on their part that these products are useful. and therefore have no moral qualms about recommending high-commission, low-quality products to their clients.
The second notable result is that at least some agents do appear more likely to recommend term in hypothetical situations where the commissions motivation is reduced. We asked the agents to consider a situation in which a cousin who lived in a distant city called to ask for advice before purchasing insurance from an agent in that city. The vignette explicitly noted that "this cousin will not buy the insurance from you, you will receive no commission, and he will buy whatever product you recommend, so you should give him the best advice possible." We posed two scenarios in the vignettes, which paralleled the term need versus whole life need audit treatments. The first cousin wanted insurance at the lowest possible premium, while the second described himself as lacking self-discipline to save and seeking a product that combined savings and insurance. 27 Summary results from these vignettes are provided in appendix table A5. Sixty-nine percent of agents recommended a term insurance policy when such a policy was appropriate for the cousin. In contrast, when the distant 27 In the "term need" vignette, the agents are told that the cousin "is worried that if he suddenly passes away, his family will have no financial means to continue living, so he wants to purchase insurance at the lowest possible premium." In the whole need vignette, the agents are told that the cousin "lacks the self-discipline, and so if possible, he'd be happy to have an insurance product that allows him to save as well as provide insurance coverage." 14 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS cousin has a self-control problem, the agent recommends term only 22% of the time (p-value <.0001). 28 These results suggest that at least some agents do appreciate that term insurance offers significant value, at least for those who do not need a savings facility. At the end of our study, we asked the agents to participate in a role-play exercise in which the surveyor played the role of the customer. Again, we instructed the agents to disregard any commission incentive. Results are given at the bottom half of panel A in table A5. This time, the results conform more closely to our experimental results: agents recommended term to those needing term 38% of the time and to those needing whole 28% of the time (a treatment effect similar in magnitude to what we estimated). These results suggest that agents, when mentally behaving as if in the selling role, are more likely to push or promote whole insurance, although we add a caveat to these results by acknowledging that both sets of vignettes were asked in the same interview and were clearly hypothetical. 29 Overall, our results cannot unambiguously identify the primary causes for the poor advice we observe in this market. The fact that most agents own whole insurance themselves suggests that workers may select into and succeed in this industry because they have mistaken beliefs about products. However, our vignettes suggest that insurance agents will recommend term insurance when it is relatively clear that this is the appropriate product.
VII. Conclusion
A critical question facing emerging markets with large swaths of the population entering the formal financial system is how these new clients will receive good information on how to make financial decisions. Recent events in developed economies suggest that regulation or improved consumer awareness may be necessary to ensure that the private sector's own incentives do not compromise the quality of financial decisions that private individuals make. This issue is of particular importance in emerging markets where new investors have little experience with formal financial products.
In this paper, we show that whole life insurance is economically inferior to a combination of investing in savings 28 We can reject at a similar level the hypothesis that the share recommending term is equal to the share doing so in our original audit study as well.
29 Unfortunately our follow-up survey did not collect information regarding the agents' mathematical abilities or experiences with actually comparing the advantages of term versus whole insurance. It would be interesting to explore in future work to what extent agents are familiar with the type of calculation we use to show the dominance of term versus whole insurance.
In addition to questions about proper products, we surveyed agents about their typical interactions with customers. There is some support for the hypothesis that agents lead with whole, 69% report including whole "always or often" in their initial recommendation, and 59% include it among their final recommendation (the second column asks whether they recommend exclusively whole; results are similar). Our surveyed agents also report discussing issues that were mentioned during our audits, suggesting our auditors were treated like typical customers. accounts and purchasing term insurance in the Indian context. We then run a series of audit studies to evaluate the quality of advice given by life insurance agents. Overall, we find that life insurance agents provide poor-quality advice: (a) they often recommend a dominated product, (b) they cater to customers' preconceptions of what the right product is even conditional on objective information about what the right product is, and (c) they compete by suggesting term insurance in addition to, as opposed to as a substitute for, whole insurance, which is a difficult decision to rationalize objectively. We find some speculative evidence that competition among agents can improve advice: customers who report having received poor recommendations from another agent in an earlier visit are more likely to receive advice to buy term insurance. One interpretation of this result is that greater competition among agents might improve advice, although other interpretations are possible as well (such as agents inferring that customers who have visited other agents are different in other ways).
In another experiment, we find that requiring disclosure of commissions on one particular product led to that product being recommended less. This result is interesting in that it suggests that hiding information may be an important part of life insurance agents' sales strategy and that disclosure requirements can change the optimal strategy of agents. In this case, it appears that the disclosure requirement on one product simply had the effect of pushing agents to recommend more opaque products. These results suggest that the disclosure requirements for financial products need to be consistent across the menu of substitutable products.
While our audit studies provide evidence that the quality of advice in this market is quite poor, what drives the prevalence of this poor information in an otherwise competitive market is still an open question. Financial markets where sales agents are motivated by commissions may cause bad advice because agents knowingly distort their advice or because the high commissions attract and reward agents who actually believe that high-commission products are better. Survey evidence from life insurance agents suggests that both of these forces play a role. Future work could focus on distinguishing these drivers, as well as understanding how these different underlying causes should influence the regulation of commissions and financial products more broadly.
